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June 2005
Mega-projects: The changing politics of urban public investment
Are Boston's $15 billion "Big Dig" and the new Los Angeles subway line harbingers of mega-projects to come, or cautionary tales for other cities? Professor David Luberoff, executive director of the Institute for Greater Boston at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, shared his predictions at the conference luncheon April 26.
To shed light on the question, Luberoff divided the politics of urban investment into four eras. In the first era, before World War II, most public works projects were locally planned and funded and had a relatively modest scale. Following the war came the era of the great mega-projects—such as the interstate system—marked by "tremendous levels of disruption in service," he said. This disruption in part triggered the third era—the protest era of the late 1960s to early 1970s—defined by constraints against both airport and highway expansion plans.
Although most histories of public works stop at about 1975, Luberoff said, it's clear from aggregate spending data that investment in transportation infrastructure—even for mega-projects—has continued. This fourth era, however, has a number of new characteristics:
"Do no harm" designs: Although some commercial property was lost for Boston's Big Dig, no houses were taken for the project. "That's extraordinary," he said. This "do no harm" approach is in stark contrast to earlier mega-projects—and costs more.
Non-routine planning: Today's mega-projects do not emerge from formal planning processes but instead are based more on political feasibility. Feasibility outweighs efficiency, and technical experts have reduced roles.
Policy entrepreneurs: Projects are strongly associated with one or two people—"policy entrepreneurs"—who can navigate the political realm to get things done. In the business world, Luberoff explained, entrepreneurs are those who see opportunities that others miss; policy entrepreneurs—almost always public officials—do exactly the same thing. In a long, iterative process, they assemble support and investment for their ideas (often from the business community), mollify critics, and give projects a face and a name. "Over time, they are critical to managing the process," he said.
Business support: More so than major corporations, "place-based" interests whose fortunes are linked to a place—such as property owners, local newspapers, and construction—play a central role. Still, he said, "this is not the world of 1958," and businesses use a much more subtle approach than in the past.
Extensive mitigation: In a huge change, the negative effects of projects are alleviated by replacing wetlands, soundproofing buildings, and other means. In practice, however, it's not always clear what is being mitigated, how it is being mitigated, and why. "There's a tremendous incentive for project supporters to acquiesce to the demands of those who might make a credible lawsuit or at least create a political problem," Luberoff said.
High and rising costs: Cost estimates are often too low due to various factors: rising land prices; regulatory obstacles that are unknown at a project's onset; and new technology, materials, and methods. The result can be a loss of public-sector credibility, he said.
Locally painless project funding: Often paid for with federal dollars and tourist revenue, "a lot of projects… are funded by taxes on people who don't live in the jurisdiction where that project is being built," he cautioned. Local residents may never be offered a vote.
End-stage controversies: All the mega-projects in this era are contentious at the end. Los Angeles, for example, raised bus fares to build its rail lines. "This caused no end of problems," Luberoff said, "because it tended to be poorer and darker-skinned people, and women, riding buses, and the trains tended to be white, male, and higher income." And unexpected problems occur: the Big Dig leaks, in part because of a management failure caused by overreliance on outside consultants, he said.
Given these factors, what is the future of mega-projects? On the one hand, regional competition, continued suburbanization, and increased congestion suggest further growth. On the other hand, mega-projects are hampered by a "pretty strict environmental regime," Luberoff said, along with post-9/11 security priorities, fiscal constraints, and loss of public-sector credibility. A good weathervane is the planned $10-20 billion expansion of O'Hare International Airport in Chicago.
In closing, Luberoff emphasized the relationship of three project variables: price, accessibility (or project benefit), and environmental degradation/disruption. Setting two of three variables determines the third. "In the end, I'm convinced that all policymaking revolves around that," he declared. Other critical elements in building coalitions are accurate cost estimates and well-planned operations, maintenance, and project management, he said.